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Abstract Web interactions usually require the exchange
of personal and confidential information for a variety of pur-
poses, including enabling business transactions and the pro-
visioning of services. A key issue affecting these interactions
is the lack of trust and control on how data are going to be
used and processed by the entities that receive it. In the tra-
ditional world, this problem is addressed using contractual
agreements, those are signed by the involved parties, and
law enforcement. This could be done electronically as well
but, in addition to the trust issue, there is currently a major
gap between the definition of legal contracts regulating the
sharing of data, and the software infrastructure required to
support and enforce them. How to enable organisations to
provide more automation in this process? How to ensure
that legal contracts can be actually enforced by the under-
lying IT infrastructure? How to enable end-users to express
their preferences and constraints within these contracts? This
article describes our R&D work to make progress towards
addressing this gap via the usage of electronic Data Sharing
Agreements (e-DSA). The aim is to share our vision, discuss
the involved challenges and stimulate further research and
development in this space. We specifically focus on a cloud
scenario because it provides a rich set of use cases involving
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1 Introduction
Sharing data among groups of organizations and/or individu-
als (hereafter generally referred to as entities) is a key neces-
sity in modern web-based society and at the very core of
business transactions. However, data sharing possess sev-
eral problems including trust, privacy, data misuse and/or
abuse, and uncontrolled propagation of data. Often organi-
zations use legal documents (contracts) to regulate the terms
and conditions under which they agree to share data among
themselves. A similar approach can be used when data are
shared between a user and an organisation. A key problem,
in the digital world, is that the constraints expressed in such
contracts remain inaccessible from the software infrastruc-
ture supporting the data sharing and management processes.
They still need to be interpreted and translated (primarily by
humans) into meaningful technical policies and constraints,
to ensure degrees of enforcement and auditing. What usually
happens, when end-users data are going to be processed by
organisations, is that end-users are asked to accept online a
series of regulatory clauses on the terms of data processing,
by simply clicking on a “Review and Accept the Terms and
Conditions” button. Furthermore, end-users find difficult to
understand these terms and conditions and how to express
their potential preferences in terms of data sharing and han-
dling.
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This introduces burdens on users and usability issues
of proposed solutions for end-to-end automation of con-
tract definitions and their enforcement. Another key problem
relates to trust. It is very complex to address. In general, there
is no guarantee that contracts will be fulfilled and that poten-
tial violations will be promptly identified. Violation detec-
tions require verification of organisational practices, auditing
and accountability frameworks. Furthermore, these contracts
could evolve so they need continue adaptation, for example
due to changes of provisioning of services, legislation, prefer-
ences, etc. This requires lifecycle management of contracts.
From a legal and technical perspective, initial work in
these areas has been carried out in various R&D projects and
initiatives, including W3C P3P (http://www.w3.org/P3P/),
IBM EPAL work (http://www.zurich.ibm.com/pri/projects/
epal.html), the PRIME [1], PrimeLife [2], Consequence [3]
and EnCoRe [4] collaborative projects. For example, mecha-
nisms regulating end-users’ privacy preferences on personal
data, sticky policies, and external and auditing trust authori-
ties have been introduced [5] to ensure that confidential data
are protected (encrypted) during the sharing process, that
access to data by organisations is constrained and subject
to the fulfillment of specific management and enforcement
steps, and degrees of assurance and accountability are pro-
vided.
In this paper, we primarily focus on the specific prob-
lem of how to provide more automation in the definition
and enforcement of data sharing contracts, by involving both
end-users (in the definition phase) and organisations (in their
definition, enforcement, and monitoring phase). We believe
this problem area is important to be addressed on its own, as
it currently introduces constraints on end-users (and organi-
zations), preventing them from having a wider adoption (and
offer) of digital services. Here, we show the functionalities
of the main components of an end-to-end e-DSA manage-
ment infrastructure, as a proof of concept towards its concrete
functioning.
Traditional legal contracts are written using natural lan-
guage, which, from a technical point of view, is complex,
difficult to parse, and prone to ambiguity. It is therefore
extremely difficult to:
– Systematically verify inconsistencies within a contract
itself or between a contract and other pre-existing ones;
– Automatically build a set of policies that can consistently
enforce the terms and conditions expressed in a contract;
– Relate violations of policies to the terms and conditions
expressed in a contract.
There is, therefore, a gap between a traditional legal contract
regulating the sharing of data and the software infrastructure
supporting it. Our work, partially carried out during the EU
Consequence project [3], aims at making progress towards
filling the gap through the usage of so-called electronic Data
Sharing Agreements (e-DSA) and enforcing them, using
privacy-aware enforcement frameworks developed in theUK
EnCoRe collaborative project [4].
e-DSA and e-DSA lifecycle An e-DSA is a human read-
able and machine processable contract regulating how orga-
nizations and/or individuals share data among themselves.
It is essentially a multilateral agreement consisting of two
parts:
– Predefined legal background information (which is usu-
ally available from a template, following, e.g., the textual
template of traditional legal contracts);
– Dynamically defined information including the defini-
tion of the validity period, the entities participating in
the agreement, and, most importantly, the statements that
constrain how data can be shared among entities (such
statements usually include authorizations and obliga-
tions).
Figure 1 shows the main phases of what we envisage to
be an e-DSA lifecycle. When an end-user tries to access (1)
a digital service—supplied by an organisation that requires
the disclosure of personal information—an interaction with
an e-DSAManagement component (2) is triggered, to define
a data sharing agreement (3), driven by available templates.
This includes: an e-DSA authoring phase (4), where individ-
uals edit the dynamic parts of the e-DSA, including autho-
rizations and/or obligations statements. At organisation side,
we imagine that the e-DSA is already filled with policies
regulating the disclosure of the end-user personal informa-
tion, according to internal regulations of the organisation and
national privacy legislation. At end-user side, users will fill
the e-DSA with their own preferences for preserving their
data privacy; an e-DSA analysis phase (5), where verifica-
tion tools identify possible conflicts between policies of the
organisation and those of the end-user; an e-DSA deploy-
ment phase follows (6)where a set of enforceable policies are
derived from the e-DSA and deployed (7) within the organ-
isation IT infrastructure. The e-DSA enforcement mecha-
nisms are used to ensure that requests to access and process
confidential data happen consistentlywith the agreed e-DSA,
both during the interactions with the service (8) and in other
contexts, including attempts of employees and/or other appli-
cations to use the data and/or disclose it to third parties. We
have currently developed the basic technologies that provide
the building blocks to support the definition of e-DSA and
their enforcement. We carried out initial validation of these
technologies in a few case studies and we are currently inte-
grating them in a demonstrator for a cloud scenario, as a
proof of concept, to illustrate our vision and open issues, and
to stimulate further research and development in this space.
123
Information sharing in the cloud 321
Fig. 1 Main e-DSA lifecycle
phases
The remaining part of this article provides an overview of
our work, an assessment of current issues, and future steps.
Roadmap Next section introduces the cloud scenario. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 present the design and prototype implementa-
tion of an authoring tool and an analyzer for the definition
of e-DSA. Sections 5 and 6 detail e-DSA deployment and
enforcement via theEnCoRe framework. In Sect. 7,we revise
related work in the area of controlled data sharing. Finally,
Sect. 8 concludes the paper.
2 Cloud scenario
We consider a cloud computing scenario as a significant
context where to leverage e-DSA, their definition and their
enforcement. The e-DSA and their automated enforcement
are key to further enable business interactions and informa-
tion flows within the Cloud, by providing additional assur-
ance and control on data to both users and businesses.
Figure 2 shows an example of involved players in the
Cloud and related information flows.
In this scenario, multiple Cloud Service Providers (CSP)
are available in the Internet. A customer uses the services
supplied by a specific CSP to access online travelling, print-
ing, office applications, etc. To access these services, cus-
tomers need to register and disclose personal data, inclu-
sive of address, financial details, etc. A CSP might need to
interact with other Service Providers to provide the required
functionalities and share relevant data to enable the business
transaction. For example, a travelling service might need to
interact with an external billing service and flight reservation
service to supply the required service to the customer.
In all these interactions, personal and confidential data
need to be gathered; it is analysed, processed and exchanged
with other parties. To avoid losing control on how data are
used, who can access it, etc., the entities that disclose infor-
mation would like to express preferences (including privacy
preferences) on how their personal and confidential data
should be handled along with authorization and obligation
constraints. Some specific examples of authorization, prohi-
bition, and obligation policies follow. The policies are related
to a generic customer called Alice.
– Authorization policies:
– Data of Alice’s credit card can be accessed by Ser-
vice Provider 1 (SP1) only for Business Transaction
purposes;
– Alice’s email address can be shared with SP2 and
SP3 only for business transaction and goods delivery
purposes.
– Prohibition policies:
– Alice’s credit card details cannot be shared with SP4.
– Obligation policies:
– Alice wants to be notified by email every time her
data is accessed;
– Alice wants to be notified every time her credit card
is disclosed to another Service Provider;
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Fig. 2 Cloud scenario
– Alice wants her data to be deleted after 1 year if not
accessed/used.
Interestingly, the stated constraintsmight need to be enforced
by all the entities involved in a chain of data disclosures, e.g.,
in the example, by the Travelling Service, the CRM Service,
etc.
Furthermore, the customer might, over time, change their
minds and modify some of their preferences and constraints.
These changes should be propagated through the chain of
information disclosures as well.
It is worth noticing that the non-expert user could intro-
duce inconsistencies in their preferences. For example, Alice
could ask for the Travelling Service (that would need some of
Alice’s data for processing), while, at the same time, denies
the access to each kind of her data. This highlights the need
for consistency verification of the set of policies defined in a
e-DSA, as clarified in the following in Sect. 4.
Finally, in the above example policies, the identifiers of the
service providers (i.e., SP1, SP2, and SP3) are just illustra-
tive. When the end-user asks to access a digital service, and
the e-DSA Management component is triggered, the elec-
tronic form for e-DSA authoring will show appropriate terms
for the service being provided (see Sect. 3 for more details).
Thus, SP1 could be, for example, the name of the provider
whose service the end-user is trying to access, and SP2, SP3
the name of the service providers that usually collaborate
with SP1. For instance, SP1 could be the name of the Travel-
ling Service, while SP2 the Flight Reservation Service SP1
usually collaborates with.
In this context, we believe that management services
to define e-DSA, coupled with enforcement mechanisms,
provide a key contribution in capturing constraints and
ensuring that they are fulfilled at the IT and operational
levels.
As shown in Fig. 3, a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) can
provide the e-DSA Management Service to enable users
(and/or other entities) to define their e-DSA, based on avail-
able templates. The CSP can use enforcement frameworks,
such as the one defined in EnCoRe [4], to deploy and enforce
agreed e-DSA. This approach can be applied to a community
of service providers: the disclosure of confidential data and
a related e-DSA from a CSP to another CSP will ensure that
the receiving CSP will also be able to deploy and enforce the
agreed e-DSA and/or a variant of it (agreed with the sharing
CSP).
Our current work provides the basic tools and capabilities
to:
1. Enable end-users (customers) and organisations to jointly
define simple e-DSA and related constraints, by means
of wizards/editors;
2. Deploy mechanisms within organisations to define and
enforce e-DSA;
3. Deploy mechanisms within organisations to agree and
share e-DSA with third parties when disclosing personal
and confidential data;
4. Enable users to update e-DSA and propagate changes to
the various points where data have been disclosed.
To achieve this, we leveraged thework carried out in the Con-
sequence Project [3] to further develop an e-DSA Manage-
ment Service, to enable organisation to support the Author-
ing, Verification of e-DSA.
123
Information sharing in the cloud 323
Fig. 3 Cloud scenario involving e-DSA management and enforcement
We also leveraged and extended the services and mecha-
nisms developed in the UK EnCoRe collaborative project [4]
(EnCoRe Toolbox) to deploy and enforce e-DSA, i.e., map
e-DSA policies into enforceable policies within an organi-
sation (or Service Provider) and further handle the process
involving the disclosure of data (and e-DSA) to third par-
ties. Specifically, the EnCoRe toolbox can be used to man-
age and enforce e-DSA policies and support the tracking
of data whereabouts (once disclosed between multiple enti-
ties). EnCoRe can handle the propagation of relevant policy
constraints (and preferences) to third parties, along with the
disclosed data. In this context, it supports the propagation of
e-DSA and their updates between the involved parties.
In the current work, we assume that each Service Provider
deploys their own implementation of both the e-DSA Man-
agement Service and the EnCoRe enforcement framework,
integratedwith their back-end services. The remaining part of
the article provides additional details about the core technolo-
gies underpinning e-DSA authoring, their analysis and their
enforcement. We highlight current challenges and opportu-
nities for additional R&D work.
3 e-DSA authoring
As introduced in Sect. 1, when an end-user tries to access
some digital service, the e-DSA Management component is
triggered, whose first step is the phase of e-DSA Authoring
(see Figs. 4 and 5).
Fig. 4 e-DSA Editor architecture
We envisage a plurality of end-users, that goes from those
simply accepting the policies for data processing defined at
organisation side to those aiming at a deeper control on how
their data are processed. The authoring tool presented in this
section allows the most demanding users to customise their
preferences on data processing, while the “easy-going” users
can, however, achieve a more explicit version of the whole
agreement, than the often obscure version offered by the tra-
ditional series of textual, contractual rules.
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Fig. 5 e-DSA Editor
From the analysis of textual DSA samples, we have
derived a generic structure for e-DSA, consisting of vari-
ous parts, among which a Title, a validity Period, the list
of Data covered by the agreement, the list of involved Par-
ties, that can be both a single user or an organization, their
respective Signatures, and (possibly empty) Authorizations,
Prohibitions, andObligations sections. The proposed author-
ing tool is focused on the editing of Authorizations, Prohi-
bitions, and Obligations sections in a human understandable
way. Such policies are edited by referring to data and involve
parties specified in the Data and Parties sections of the e-
DSA respectively. Although the definition of the Data and
Parties sections is out of scope for this work, we remark that
data items and parties are referred to using unique identifiers
(possibly a URI), and that data types, and related attributes,
like, e.g., author, size, creation date, ... are defined in formal
customizable vocabularies (also named ontologies).
Wedeveloped an initial prototype of e-DSAEditor, a light-
weight Web-based application allowing users to edit an e-
DSA using a controlled natural language (CNL4DSA [6]).
Our Web-based Editor aims at simplifying the creation and
modification of an e-DSA by non-technical users, and, at the
same time, producing the formal representation of the e-DSA
content, thus enabling its automated processing. The con-
trolled natural language is used for the authoringof authoriza-
tion, prohibition, and obligation statements. Figure 4 illus-
trates the high-level architecture of the prototype of e-DSA
editor. The front-end layer is a lightweight Web 2.0 applica-
tion, based on AJAX techniques, enabling interactive editing
of an e-DSA. The front-end layer relies on the application
service layer for accessing e-DSA data and related vocabu-
lary. Indeed, part of an e-DSA is an external customizable
vocabulary that defines the set of terms, actions and predi-
cates that users can combine to build statements. The storage
abstraction layer decouples the application from the actual
storage systems (filesystem or database or content manage-
ment systems, etc.) that is used for storing e-DSA and vocab-
ularies. The tool displays the predefined legal background
information from one of the available templates, and allows
the user to interactively fill in the dynamic information of
the e-DSA, and particularly the authorization and obligation
statements. Note that both the organisations and the end-
users (customers) are expected to use the authoring tool. As
a temporal sequence, we expect that the organisations fill
their parts of authorisations, prohibitions, and obligations
(according to their internal regulations and National privacy
directives), and then the customer can set her privacy pref-
erences on her data disclosure. Figure 5 is a screenshot of
the e-DSA Editor showing some sections of an example e-
DSA where the authorisations, prohibitions, and obligations
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sections are highlighted. The editor drives the authoring of
statements by displaying terms taken from a customizable
vocabulary, and by following CNL4DSA predefined syntax
patterns (for example “IF [set of conditions] THEN [subject]
CAN [action] [object]”).
On the one hand, the language defines the structure of the
allowed statements, through the use of “AFTER [...] THEN
[...]” and “IF [...] THEN [...]” constructs, logic conjunction
and disjunction, and keywords such as CAN, CANNOT, and
MUST (indicating if the statement being composed is an
authorisation, prohibition, or obligation, respectively). Based
on an ANTLR grammar definition (http://www.antlr.org/),
we derive a Finite State Machine (FSM) that implements the
grammar of CNL4DSA, and we implement the FSM on the
client side of the DSA Authoring tool. The type of the term
selected by the user (action, subject, object, and predicate)
determines the state transitions of the FSM.
On the other hand, the language remains openwith respect
to the actual terms used to build the statements. Such terms
are domain-specific and are taken from an external vocab-
ulary, which is defined by a formal ontology. The ontology
is defined through the Protégé open-source ontology editor
(http://protege.stanford.edu/). By exploiting the ontological
relationships, the editor can also ensure semantic correct-
ness of the statements. The editor can also exploit concept
hierarchies in the ontology defining the vocabulary to auto-
matically expand statements that contain implicit meaning
(for example, generic concepts are automatically replaced
by a disjunction of their most specialized subclasses).
The following is an example of the kind of policies that it
is possible to edit with the e-DSA Editor:
IF data has category “credit card details” AND a
provider has identifier “SP1” AND that data has pur-
pose “business transaction” THEN that provider CAN
access that data
The above authorization is the CNL4DSA version of the
first authorization listed in the Sect. 2.
In the screenshot shown in Fig. 5, the user is editing a
new authorization; the list of available vocabulary terms is
displayed in a pop-up window (“available choices”). When
authoring a statement, the user can also make references to
previously used terms (in the same or other statements). For
example, in the previous authorization, the expression “that
data” is a reference to the term “data” appearing at the begin-
ning (“IF data …”). The e-DSA Editor enables the creation
of references with a simple point-and-click mechanism (the
user points to the term that she wants to refer to, and the
reference is automatically created). Additionally, the e-DSA
Editor can highlight references in the various statements, thus
showing the implicit interconnections.
The final result produced by the authoring tool is an e-
DSA, saved as XML, and it contains both the English ver-
sion and the CNL4DSA version of the authorizations, prohi-
bitions, and obligations.
It is worth noticing that the editing phase is driven by the
tool that shows to the editor only the set of available terms
taken from a predefined ontology. Ontologies are domain-
specific and the organisations are in charge of define them.
Furthermore, the available terms are selected taken into
account the nature of the policy that the author is composing,
e.g., if the author has selected the predicate “has category”,
the tool will then show terms referred to data and it does not
show terms related to, e.g., subjects or actions, since “has
category” is a predicate for data.
4 e-DSA analysis
Even if the e-DSA authoring is simplified by the pre-defined
ontology, and so a predefined set of specific terms which
to choose from, policies are composed both by policy mak-
ers at organisations and by end-users. This could cause the
presence of conflicting policies among the policy set edited
through the authoring tool (either because the policies writ-
ten by the end-users are in contradiction with each others, or
because they conflict with the policies written by the policy
makers at organisations). Two, or more, policies are conflict-
ing when they oppositely evaluate with respect to the same
access request (i.e., one policy allows the request, while the
other denies it). Thus, the e-DSA lifecycle provides an e-DSA
analysis phase, where the policies edited in the authoring
phase are checked to search possible conflicts. The sequence
“authoring-analysis” is supposed to be iterative: authoring is
followed by policy analysis, and, in case of existence of con-
flicts, the authoring is needed again to reconsider the policies.
There could be also the case that, in case of conflict detection,
the organisations do not want to re-consider their policies
(either for legislation constraints, or business purposes). In
any case, the end-user should be made aware of the detected
discrepancy between her preferences and the constraints in
force at organisation side.
Themain goal of the e-DSAAnalyser is to detect conflicts
between policies. However, through the analyser it is also
possible to answer specific questions related to single policies
and visualize a table of access:
– Conflict detection the tool checks if a set of policies is
conflict-free. In particular, conflicts are searched either
between an authorization and a prohibition clause or
between an obligation and a prohibition clause. The tool
does not check conflicts between an authorization and
an obligation because we are assuming that any obliged
action is implicitly authorized.
– Questions related to single queries The tool answers spe-
cific questions regarding authorizations, obligations, and
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prohibitions, like “is it true that subject x is authorised
to perform action z on object y, under a set of contextual
conditions?”
– Table of accessThis table shows all the actions authorised
by a set of policies, under a set of contextual conditions.
In the scenario discussed in this paper, we envisage that
policy makers and policy experts at organisations (support-
ing e-DSA management) will use this tool to carry out the
validation of draft e-DSA before carrying on with the other
steps. In particular, by querying the tool with a specific ques-
tion, the policy maker can be assured that the set of policies
guarantees indeed certain rights on data, and denies others.
Moreover, the table of accesses is a quick way to visualise all
the actions permitted by the set of policies over a set of data,
being performed by a set of subjects. This gives a global and
fast vision of the authorisations enabled by the policies. The
noticeable aspect of the tool is that policymakers/experts can
check the presence of conflicts in an automatic way. Either
the e-DSA is accepted (in case of no conflicts) or suitable
feedback is provided for resolution of conflicts. The primary
feedback is an alert message advising that a conflict exists
(see the following analysis example and Fig. 8). Secondarily,
the issue is how to solve the detected conflict. Conflict resolu-
tion strategies are outside the scope of this paper. However,
in Sect. 7, we give details of possible conflict resolutions
strategies and automatic prototype implementations of these
strategies.
The e-DSA Analyser consists of two parts:
– The formal engine Maude [7] that actually performs the
analysis of the policies;
– A graphical user interface that allows the user to dynami-
cally load contextual conditions and queries for the analy-
sis of a set of policies.
The engine. CNL4DSA has been designed with a precise
formal semantics, based on a modal labelled transition sys-
tem [8]. Thus, the language is governed by rules regulating
states and transitions between these states. This allows for
a precise translation of CNL4DSA in Maude. Maude is an
executable programming language that models distributed
systems and the actions within those systems [7]. Systems
are specified by defining algebraic data types axiomatizing
system’s states, and rewrite rules declaring the relationships
between the states and the transitions between them. Maude
is executable and comes with a built in toolkit that allows
formal reasoning about the specifications produced. In par-
ticular, the Maude toolkit can be exploited to search for
allowed traces, i.e., sequence of actions, of a policy speci-
fied in CNL4DSA. These traces represent the sequences of
actions that are authorised, or required, or denied by the pol-
icy.
CNL4DSA has been made executable by translating its
syntax and formal semantics in Maude. The Maude template
used for the analysis of the policies is available at: http://
www.iit.cnr.it/staff/marinella.petrocchi/template.maude. This tem-
plate contains static parts defining the translation from
CNL4DSA to Maude and logic operators. Also, some mod-
ules are dynamically loaded depending on the kind of poli-
cies, contextual conditions, and queries that the user is going
to deal with.
The graphical user interface. The GUI is deployed as
a Web Application. It enables the user (in our scenario, the
policy experts at organisations) to query the analysis engine
and visualize its results. The analysis engine exposes its func-
tionalities as Web Service methods. The GUI is in charge of
retrieving the set of policies that the policy expert wants to
analyze and the related vocabulary from a repository. Both
the set of policies and the vocabulary are defined by means
of the e-DSA Editor. The expert can create dynamic contexts
that represent the environment under which the analysis will
be performed. As an example, a possible context could be:
the category of data which the analysis is interested in “credit
card details”; the identifier of the service provider is “SP4”;
and the purpose of access which the analysis is interested in
“Business Transaction”. Figure 6 shows a phase of the selec-
tion of some contextual conditions. It is worth noticing that,
in our implementation, the selected contexts are set to true,
and we assume that everything that is not explicitly specified
does not hold. Hence, the analyst shall select each context
that is supposed to be true.
Once defining the context, the analyst has three possibil-
ities, as anticipated above. Either she can ask for conflict
detection, or she can compose a query and perform succes-
sive elaboration on it, or she can ask for the table of access.
Figure 7 shows a query composition, in which the analyst is
composing a query related to an obligation: by composing
the query shown in the figure, and launching the succes-
sive analysis, the question of the analysis is if it is true that,
among the policies set under investigation, a policy exists
such that, after that the provider has accessed the data, then
the user must be notified by email about this access. The
analysis will instantiate the question with the defined con-
Fig. 6 e-DSA analyser: context insertion
123
Information sharing in the cloud 327
Fig. 7 e-DSA analyser: query composition
Fig. 8 e-DSA analyser: conflict detection
text, i.e., is it true that, after that SP4 has accessed data of
category “credit card details of the user”, then the user is
notified?.
The GUI sends all the inputs, i.e., the vocabulary, the
CNL4DSA description of the policies, the context and the
queries to Maude, which performs the analysis. Finally, the
results are shown. As an example, Fig. 8 shows the conflict
detected by the analyserwhen considering the following sim-
ple authorization and prohibition policies:
– Alice’s credit card data can be shared with SP3 and SP4
for business transaction purposes;
– Alice’s credit card data cannot be shared with SP4.
These two policies give and deny to SP4 the possibility
of accessing the credit card data of Alice. In particular,
the authorisation could have been set, at organisation side,
through the e-DSAauthoring toolwhile the prohibition could
have been set by Alice, at end-user side, through the same
authoring tool.
When the following contextual conditions are set:
– datum has data category “credit card”;
– provider is “SP4”;
– datum has purpose “business transaction”;
both the authorization and the prohibition are enacted.
The alert message in Fig. 8 is then shown to the ana-
lyst. The analysis result gives a clue of inconsistency among
the policies in the e-DSA. At this point, we envisage that
the analyst will run one of the existing automatic method-
ologies for solving conflicts among access control policies.
In the Related Work section, we will discuss some of these
approaches, that can be conveniently adapted and be inte-
grated in the e-DSA analyser, to automatically solve conflicts
once spotted.
The main challenge in our analysis approach is about
usability and the potential complexity for common users in
fully understanding the results it provides. This is the reason
why we envisage that the system could be used by trained
personnel in the organisations (such as policy makers and
policy experts), whilst end-users will be only exposed to
simple, high-level information highlighting potential issues
and ways to solve them. We believe that the validation of
e-DSA, the identification of conflicts and issues and the
process of conveying information to different stakeholders
in a suitable way are key research areas that require further
investigation.
Upon e-DSA authoring and analysis, e-DSA are deployed
and enforced by organizations. In the following section, we
discuss the technical capabilities of the EnCoRe framework
[4] and how it can be leveraged for the deployment and
enforcement of e-DSA policies within and across organi-
sations.
5 EnCoRe policy enforcement framework
EnCoRe [4,9] is a UK collaborative project that involves
contributors from the social, legal, and technological areas.
EnCoRe provides user-friendly and reliable privacy manage-
ment capabilities to individuals and organisations. Specif-
ically, EnCoRe provides data subjects (users) with better
control on their personal data once disclosed to organisa-
tions, by enabling them to provide privacy preferences on
how data should be handled. Data subjects can subsequently
change these preferences. EnCoRe enables organisations to
fully enforce these preferences, along with security and pri-
vacy policies, which include authorization, obligation, and
prohibition policies. The EnCoRe technical capabilities are
described in full details in the EnCoReD2.3 TechnicalArchi-
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Fig. 9 EnCoRe main features
tecture [4]. These capabilities are provided by a related
EnCoRe toolbox. Figure 9 shows its key, privacy&dataman-
agement capabilities that can be deployed within and across
organisations.
As shown in Fig. 9, EnCoRe includes severalmechanisms,
as (1) to capture end-users’ privacy choices via explicit pri-
vacy preferences, (2) deploy and enforce them within the
organisation via privacy-aware access control and obliga-
tion management modules (driven by configurable policies),
(3)(6) tracking data whereabouts and providing controlled
disclosure of data via the sticky policies mechanism [5],
and (4) auditing and logging the various activities involving
data handling and disclosures. Furthermore, EnCoRe enables
end-users to subsequently change their choice and supports
the propagation of changes across all the involved enti-
ties (e.g., organisations where data have been disclosed to)
(5).
End-users’ preferences can potentially include purposes
for which data could be used, criteria about which third
parties could get access these data, various obligations
(e.g., about notification, deletion, etc.). They are mapped
into enforceable policies in the back-end EnCoRe access
control and obligation management components, driven by
policies.
The “EnCoRe Toolbox” term refers to the set of tech-
nical capabilities provided by EnCoRe. Figure 10 shows the
high-level EnCoRe Technical Architecture underpinning this
toolbox and maps the EnCoRe capabilities to its various
architectural components [4]. The EnCoRe technical compo-
nents have been designed and implemented as independent,
configurable services: they support secure communication
and audit/logging capabilities. Specifically they support four
common use cases [4], that animate the components shown
in Fig. 10:
– An end-user discloses personal data along with privacy
preferences: the information is sent to the EnCoRe back-
end Consent & Revocation Provisioning component for
internal configuration (via policies and the data registry,
to track data whereabouts). This includes setting Privacy
Obligations in the Privacy Obligation Manager;
– Employees and/or applications trying to access data for
specific purposes (e.g., marketing, transaction process-
ing, research, etc.): the Privacy-aware Access Control
module intercepts these requests (via SQL interception
and/or specific interception points within applications)
andgrants/denies access basedon the evaluationof autho-
rization policies. Of course these technical capabilities do
not address the case of fraudulent Service Providers that
might just bypass EnCoRe controls or not deploy them
at all. The EnCoRe work provides additional capabilities
in terms of compliance and auditing [9] to determine the
principles that organisations need to fulfill to be EnCoRe
compliant as well as the criteria for monitoring and audit-
ing;
– End-user changes his privacypreferences:EnCoReenable
end-users to monitor the status of their data and if their
preferences have been fulfilled (e.g., in terms of notifi-
cations, data deletion, etc.). The end-user can change, at
any time, their privacy preferences. This triggers a chain
of updates of stored privacy preferenceswithin the organ-
isation. If the related data were shared with third parties,
these parties will also receive update notifications (by
leveraging the Data Registry component);
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Fig. 10 Key capabilities provided by EnCoRe
– Personal data are disclosed to a third party: the system
intercepts the attempt of applications to disclose data to
third parties (via locally deployed agents). Personal data
are disclosed to the third party via the external workflow
manager, using the sticky policy mechanisms that bundle
data to policies and privacy preferences [5]. The data
registry is updated.
The EnCoRe technical solution, developed in the course (4
years) of the EnCoRe project, has been tested and refined
in the context of 3 case studies, involving: Enterprise Data;
a Biobanking organisation; the UK government’s Iden-
tity Assurance Programme. A final implementation of the
EnCoRe technical solution is currently available [4]. These
case studies provided confidence that the EnCoRe solution
can be integrated with state-of-the-art enterprise back-end
solutions, in particular Identity Management and User Pro-
visioning/Deprovisioning solutions. Of course, the actual
integration complexity depends on the specific situation, for
example due to the presence of legacy situations.Weexplored
workarounds using solution and API wrappers in two case
studies.
We believe EnCoRe provides a suitable framework tomap
e-DSAconstraints (including authorizations and obligations)
into enforceable and monitorable policies within and across
organisations. More details follow. The EnCoRe architecture
implements explicit capabilities to handle (privacy-aware)
authorization policies for access control and obligation poli-
cies. These policies [4] can be flexibly defined and extended.
In this context, we envisage using the EnCoRe framework to
support the management of the e-DSA policies in a way that
can be enforced and monitored. Specifically, we explored
how to translate the e-DSA authorization, prohibition, and
obligation constraints into an internal programmatic XML
representation, that captures the various e-DSA conditions
along with references to data items. This includes constraints
that dictate:
– agreed purposes for accessing and disclosing data;
– which entities can/cannot access the data and or data
can/cannot be disclosed to (access control constraints);
– deletion, notification, data minimisation, etc. activities
(obligation constraints).
EnCoRe authorization policies are compatiblewith (and sim-
ilar to) XACML access control policies [10]: for brevity,
we omit their description. Details are available [4]. These
policies have been extended to take into account e-DSA
constraints including checking the requesters’ purpose for
accessing/disclosing data, whitelisting and blacklisting of
potential data receivers, etc. At the enforcement time,
EnCoRe detects when end-users’ data are accessed (via inter-
ception points, such as SW function wrappers or SQL inter-
ception) and policies are enforced. In terms of EnCoRe oblig-
ation policies, we present the following simple example,
based on an internal XML representation:
<obligation>
<name>obligation-ID1</name>
<type>one-off</type>
<target>attributes</target>
<eventList>
<event>Event_Access_Granted</event>
</eventList >
<trigger>
<expression>
<and>
<condition>
Request.Obj.Location==‘‘PII.DB’’
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</condition>
<condition>
Context.PrivacyPreferences.Notify == YES
</condition>
</and>
</expression>
</trigger>
<actions>
<action>
<do>send notification to data subjects</do>
<onViolation >Log error</onViolation>
</action>
</actions>
</obligation>
This obligation policy is an internal representation of the
following e-DSA obligation: “Notify Alice by email every
time her data is accessed”.
At the enforcement time,EnCoRedetectswhen end-users’
data are accessed and sends notifications to data subjects, if
they required to do it (based on their preferences). A detailed
descriptionof the representationofEnCoRepolicies and their
enforcement capabilities is available [4]. The next section
provides additional details about our currentwork to leverage
the EnCoRe framework for the deployment and enforcement
of e-DSA, along with existing open issues.
6 e-DSA Deployment and enforcement via EnCoRe
The deployment and enforcement of e-DSA within organ-
isations is a complex task. This includes the deployment
of the various e-DSA management components within a
Service Provider, their integration with existing Security,
Identity Management, and business components. The entire
process involving the authoring, validation, deployment and
enforcement of e-DSA can be achieved in practice, as fol-
lows. Data subjects (users), at the time of disclosing their
personal data and preferences, engage in the definition of e-
DSA by means of e-DSA management services provided by
the Service Providers. Each Service Provider may provide a
domain specific vocabulary of terms that can be used within
the controlled natural language used by the e-DSA Editor.
The resulting e-DSA, once validated by the e-DSAAnalyser,
contain references to the relevant types of data items to be dis-
closed and the agreed policies. These policies reflect, among
other things, the (privacy) preferences expressed by the user.
As shown in Fig. 9b), users disclose their personal data
along with the generated e-DSA, using the user side EnCoRe
web plug-in. This information is intercepted by the EnCoRe
Consent & Revocation Provisioning Component (integrated
within theServiceProvider back-end solutions). This compo-
nent analyses the content of the e-DSA. It stores the data in the
Service Provider Data Repositorywhilst the extracted prefer-
ences and the e-DSA are stored in the EnCoRe Data Registry
(along with a reference to the actual data). Furthermore, it
extracts the policies from the e-DSA, maps them into the
EnCoRe internal representation of authorisation and obliga-
tion policies (1-1 mapping) and deploys them respectively in
the EnCoRe Privacy-aware Access Control and Obligation
Management components. Access to data is regulated by the
EnCoRe Access Control component driven by the policies
and the specific user preferences (contained in the e-DSA).
The ObligationManagement component deals with involved
duties, such as sending notifications, deleting or minimis-
ing data, etc. As previously discussed in the four general
use cases, the EnCoRe framework supports changes made
by users to the e-DSA and related policies and preferences.
These changes are reflected in the entire chain of data disclo-
sures via a sequence of update requests and local updates of
the configuration of EnCoRe internal systems. EnCoRe also
deals with the steps involved with the sharing of data with
third parties.
Whilst the work done in EnCoRe shows the technical fea-
sibility of mapping e-DSA into enforceable policies and its
integration with organisation’s back-end services, additional
work has to be done on the overall trust and accountability
issues. This is a general problem, beyond e-DSA manage-
ment, as it is about how to provide trust and accountability
on personal and confidential data once disclosed to third par-
ties. Initial accountability work has been carried out by HP
Labs in their sticky policies work [5]. Additional work has
been carried out in EnCoRe in terms of exploring compli-
ance and auditing mechanisms. However, trust and account-
ability are still open issues: these areas provide key oppor-
tunities for further R&D work. More R&D work is required
in the overall lifecycle management of e-DSA contracts, due
to changes of organisation business and supply chains. For
example, changes in the supply of services and reliance on
specific SPsmight require the revision of e-DSA, contractual
agreements, etc.
7 Related work
Controlled data protection and sharing in cloud environments
currently present challenging open issues. This is testified by
pretty new research efforts, as, e.g., A4Cloud [11] (Account-
ability for the Cloud, a 4-year EU FP7 funded project started
in late 2012) whose main scope is to “increase trust in cloud
computing by devising methods and tools, through which
cloud stakeholders can be made accountable for the pri-
vacy and confidentiality of information held in the cloud.
These methods and tools will combine risk analysis, policy
enforcement, monitoring and compliance auditing”. Also,
we mention here the newborn EU FP7 funded project CoCo-
Cloud [12] (Confidential and Compliant Cloud, a 3-year col-
laborative project, started in November, 2013). The project
aims to facilitate data sharing in the Cloud, by providing
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end-to-end data centric security from the client to the cloud,
based on the (semi-) automated enforcement of Data Shar-
ing Agreements. Both projects have an eye to technical and
legal solutions for corporate and personal data processed
in cloud service provision ecosystems. The CoCo-Cloud
project specifically focuses on the automatic management
of Data Sharing Agreements.
In this paper, we mainly deal with technological solu-
tions enabling such automatic management (to the consistent
definition of the electronic agreement, to its deployment at
enforcement at organisation side). However, the use of Cloud
Computing technologies intersects with the law in areas like
data protection and sharing [13]. In cases where personal
data are processed, legal obligations under European data
protection laws are applicable [14]. Location and treatment
of data remain relevant where data protection laws impose
restrictions on the processing of personal data [15]. A current
practice in Cloud deployment involves the creation of “one-
size-fits-all” agreements [16]. This raises many novel legal
questions [17] as well as the non-compliance of even the
most standardized Cloud Computing models with national
laws [18]. Enabling cloud models preserving privacy of data
by maintaining compliance with regulatory norms and Law
is a fascinating ground open to investigation.
Here, we focus on technical approaches, and we revise
related work in the area of controlled data sharing and man-
agement, by primarily focusing on authoring and analysis
of data sharing policies. Also, we highlight novelties, in
our vision of an integrated approach, with respect to past
projects, i.e., PRIME, PrimeLife, Consequence, and Encore
itself.
Policy authoring. Series of work in [19–23] connect pol-
icy authoring tools with the capability of common users to
use them. In [19], the authors carry out a laboratory evalu-
ation of a variety of user-centric methods for privacy poli-
cies authoring, to identify which design decisions should be
taken for flexible and usable privacy enabling techniques.
Work in [20] continues this line of research, by providing a
parser which identifies the privacy policy elements in rules
entered in natural languages: identification of such elements
is a key step for subsequent translation of natural sentences in
enforceable constructs (such as the XACML language [10]).
Authors of [21] recall security and privacy policy-authoring
tasks in general, and discover further usability challenges
that policy authoring presents. In [22], the authors present
the Coalition Policy Management Portal for policies author-
ing, verification, and deployment, with the goal of provid-
ing “easy to use mechanisms for refining high-level user-
specified goals into low-level controls”. These works show
an implementation of a prototype architecture called SPAR-
CLE (Server Privacy Architecture and Capability Enable-
ment). This aims at helping privacy professionals to create
policies in natural language and translate those into system
readable commands. The interface is designed for a desktop
usage that provides a syntax guide for writing policies in nat-
ural language.Work in [23] advances the notion of templates-
based authoring tools, for users with different roles and skill
sets, as, e.g., vendors, service providers, end-users, and IT
administrators. Thus, the authors propose different templates
to edit privacy policies, each of them needing different user
skills, and they model a prototype interface, still not imple-
mented. From a business perspective, Axiomatics offers a
desktop interface for policy authoring [24]. The GUI pro-
vides support to IT administrators to edit XACML policies.
Although such supporting features drive the policy makers
to come up with correct machine readable policies, relevant
technical skills are needed to manage the tool. From a social
networking perspective, work in [25] presents a collabora-
tive authoring tool, allowing several individuals to specify
policies over data published on social networks, and whose
disclosuremay affect their privacy. The authors acknowledge
some usability issues in their prototype implementation, and
future work are foreseen towards a user-friendly authoring
interface. The proposed tool approaches the problem from
a different prospective. Indeed, the interface allows users to
write policies on own data by the setting of an authorization
to other users and without involving their data (data centric
model). Furthermore, different entities that specify policies
on a same data are unaware of the existence of policies writ-
ten by others. All the policies are analyzed at run-time after
each access request to the data.
Achievements and ongoing work on the authoring tool The
authoring tool presented in Sect. 3 has the peculiarity to edit
e-DSA, the electronic version of traditional textual data shar-
ing agreements. These agreements consist of different infor-
mative fields, such as, e.g., the kind of data covered by the
agreement, the involved parties, the validity of the agree-
ment, the data sharing policies over data, etc. The e-DSA
are authored through a graphical interface that truthfully re-
creates the original fields. The author is guided by drop-down
menus offering choices within a pre-defined ontology that is
specific of the domain of the organisations that are offering a
digital services to the end-users. We conducted an usability
study of our initial prototype of the e-DSAEditor with a team
of external evaluators, including both engineers and man-
agers (such a study has been carried out during the FP7 Euro-
pean Project Consequence [3]). The evaluators suggested
many improvements related to both the user interaction and
the user interface. However, the evaluators also recognized
the value of the approach. In terms of the controlled natural
language used in the e-DSA Editor, the evaluators provided
additional feedback about extending its expressiveness. We
are taking this feedback into account while evolving our cur-
rent prototype implementation towards a more user-friendly
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editing and the use of a complete natural language (see, e.g.,
work in [26]). Closing, we believe that there are key R&D
opportunities in the space of e-DSA authoring in terms of
how to create suitable wizards to simplify the overall e-DSA
management process and build GUIs that are simple to use
to a broad set of end-users.
Policy analysis. Data protection policy analysis is essen-
tial to detect inconsistencies and conflicts before the enforce-
ment of policies actual. The e-DSA Analyser presented in
Sect. 4 builds on research results developed in [27–29] and
it exploits the controlled language CNL4DSA [6] to per-
form formal analysis of the policy clauses. In the various
work, different scenarios have been taken into account, from
e-Health to Business and Industry. In [30], it is shown that
the Event-B language (http://www.event-b.org) can be used
to model obliged events. The Rodin platform provides ani-
mation and model checking toolset for analyzing specifica-
tions written in Event-B, thus leading to capability of oblig-
ations analysis [31]. The authors of [32] propose a compre-
hensive framework for expressing highly complex privacy-
related policies, featuring purposes and obligations. Also, a
formal definition of conflicting permission assignments is
given, together with efficient conflict-checking algorithms.
The Policy Design Tool [33] offers a sophisticated way for
modeling and analysing high-level security requirements in
a business context and create security policy templates in a
standard format. There exists also generic formal approaches
that could exploit a priori for the analysis of some aspects
of data protection policies. As an example, the Klaim fam-
ily of process calculi [34] provides a high-level model for
distributed systems, and, in particular, exploits a capability-
based type system for programming and controlling access
and usage of resources. Finally, work in [35] exploits a static
analyzer for a variant of Klaim.
Policy conflict detection is generally followed by res-
olutions of conflicts. Not necessarily tied to data protec-
tion, existing work concerns general conflict resolution
methods for access control in various areas. The approach
adopted by the eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [10] is a very general one and defines stan-
dard rule-combining algorithms: Deny-Overrides, Permit-
Overrides, First-Applicable, and Only-One- Applicable. As
an example, the Deny-Overrides algorithm states that the
result of the policy is Deny if the evaluation of at least one
of the rules returns Deny. A classification of anomalies that
may occur among firewall policies is presented in [36]. In the
samework, an editing tool allows a user to insert, modify, and
remove policy rules to avoid anomalies. Also, work in [37]
proposesmethods for preventing policy conflicts,more than a
strategy for solving themwhen they occur. Both work in [38]
and [39] focus on conflict resolution strategies for data pro-
tection policies within e-health scenarios. In [38], the authors
suggest a resolution strategy based on high level features of
the policy as a whole (such as the recency of a policy). If
such characteristics are not sufficient for deciding which pol-
icy should be applied, the default deny approach is applied.
With respect to that solution, the approach in [39] aims at
defining a finer grained strategy, based on a finer definition
of the policy specificity. In particular, it firstly evaluates the
specificity of the policy in identifying each element, namely:
subject, object, action and environment. Then, it combines
these values through a weighted sum, that allows the authors
to assign more relevance to the specificity of the definition
of one of the policy element with respect to the others (e.g.,
we could choose that the specificity in defining the subject
is 2 times more relevant than the specificity in defining the
object). This strategy has been implemented in [40]. This
work presents a running prototype, based on the XACML
engine, that implements the resolution strategy based on the
policy specificity as an extension to the standard XACML
combining algorithms. Experimental results show the proto-
type to be efficient in terms of execution time, on a variable
number of conflicting policies.
Achievements and ongoing work on the analysis tool The
analysis tool presented in Sect. 4 is specifically tailored to
analyse e-DSA clauses and spot conflicts that may exist
among authorisations and prohibitions (or among obligations
and prohibitions). These clauses are thought to be edited
through the authoring tool presented in Sect. 3. Thus, our
attempt is towards enabling an interactive and mostly auto-
matic e-DSA generation phase. Even if not relying on such
a lifecycle (i.e., they have not an associated policy editor),
works in [30,31] follow an approach similar to ours, since
they focus on the analysis of data protection policies exploit-
ing formal tools. The main difference with our approach
is the nature of the specification language that is input to
the analyser. Indeed, the Maude specification language (as
well as other languages based on rewriting logics) puts the
accent on execution traces, by focusing on which allowed,
forbidden, or obliged actions are performed (or not) by sys-
tem runs. On the other hand, Event-B specifies properties
on the state of a system more than ones on the system
transitions. This difference leads to use different analysis
methodologies: the former work analyses execution traces
of the system, while the latter configuration states. How-
ever, the two works are pretty similar (their results have
been achieved within the same research project and almost
simultaneously).
Following the suggestions of the Consequence evaluators,
we added an help on line facility in the current version of the
analysis tool, to mitigate usability issues. Similarly to what
discussed regarding policy authoring, we believe that there
are open challenges in the space of e-DSA analysis, e.g.,
in terms of how to integrate efficient conflict solvers in the
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e-DSA analyser and give also non-expert users the flavour
of the nature of conflicts and of the adopted solutions, to
go further towards the e-DSA deployment and enforcement
phases.
Comparisonswithpast collaborativeprojects.Relevant
related work on the management, deployment, and enforce-
ment of privacy policies has been carried out in the recent
past, as testified, e.g., by the research results of the follow-
ing key collaborative projects: PRIME [1], PrimeLife [2],
EnCoRe [4], and Consequence [3]. PRIME and PrimeLife
specify a wide range of policies (including authorizations,
obligations and data handling policies) along with enforce-
ment mechanisms: however, these policies are often created
and managed by organisations. It was beyond the key objec-
tives of these projects to provide advanced tools and GUI to
author and check for policy consistency through analysers.
Solutions developed in these projects allow users to provide
their privacy preferences (along with degrees of preferences’
revocation, in EnCoRe) that, however, would be used within
organisational-driven policies, for enforcement and monitor-
ing purposes. The EnCoRe architecture implements explicit
capabilities to handle privacy preferences (as authorisation
and obligation policies). Thus, we envisage the EnCoRe pol-
icy deployment and enforcement framework to be able to
work with e-DSA: Sect. 6 has provided details on how e-
DSA definition (authoring and analysis) and EnCoRe policy
deployment and enforcement framework can co-exist in a
synergistic way, and how the two phases can conveniently
complement one another. In particular, we think that (1) the
user’s privacy preferences can be indeed encoded, through
the authoring tool, in the e-DSA template; (2) a consistency
check over the e-DSA can be applied through the analysis
phase; and (3) the EnCoRe deployment and enforcement
framework can be applied to a conflict-free e-DSA. EnCoRe
complements the generation of e-DSA, by enforcing the e-
DSA policies.
One of the main goals of Consequence was to provide an
infrastructure for e-DSA, supporting the (semi)-automatic
generation of the agreements (authoring + analysis). The
technical descriptions of the authoring tool and the analysis
tool can be found in [41]. Themain differences betweenwhat
we propose here and what has been done in Consequence are
that (1) the definition of e-DSA was driven only by organ-
isations, without a “multi-stakeholder” handshake; and (2)
distributed scenarios such as the Cloud were not addressed.
As testified by really recent European initiatives (e.g., the
newborn EU project CoCo-Cloud [12], the adoption of e-
DSA for facilitating data sharing in cloud scenarios is a chal-
lenging issue that is worth to be addressed. With the current
work, we shed light to the building blocks of a possible end-
to-end data-centric security architecture, to make progress
towards a better control on sensitive data in distributed
environments.
8 Conclusions
We believe that the joint usage of e-DSA management
tools (like authoring and analysis tools) and suitable policy
enforcement frameworks can help to make progress towards
enabling users to have better control on their data once dis-
closed (e.g., in the Cloud) as well as increase the level of
accountability of the various involved parties. The manage-
ment of e-DSA described in this paper and the EnCoRe tech-
nical framework can support degrees of automation and pol-
icy enforcement. This is a first step towards addressing the
automation problem. Our technologies can offer a support
for users and organisations to fill the existing gap between
stating policies and ensuring that they can be enforced by
organisations.
To validate our vision and approach, we have currently
developed the key technologies required for the manage-
ment, deployment and enforcement of e-DSA within and
across organisations. Some of these solutions have already
been validated in a few case studies and collaborative UK
and EU projects: the outcomes are encouraging and, at the
same, enabled us to further understand the complexity of the
problem.
A few key technical challenges still need to be fully
addressed, including the deployment of the e-DSA manage-
ment framework within an operational (cloud) environment,
its integration with back-end solutions and its overall lifecy-
cle management. Additional R&Dwork has to be carried out
on improving the usability of the e-DSA authoring and analy-
sis tools. In our view, these are key challenges that—in addi-
tion to more general trust and accountability issues—need to
be fully addressed to enable the development of commercial
solutions in this space.
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